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Competition and the Rate of Return
THERE is no more important proposition in economic theory than that,
under competition, the rate of return on investment tends toward equality
in all industries. Entrepreneurs will seek to leave relatively unprofitable
industries and enter relatively profitable industries, and with competition
there will be neither public nor private barriers to these movements. This
mobility of capital is crucial to the efficiency and growth of the economy:
in a world of unending change in types of products that consumers and
businesses and governments desire, in methods of producing given products,
and in the relative availabilities of various resources—in such a world the
immobility of resources would lead to catastrophic inefficiency.'
Movements of capital are presumably dominated by the prospective
rate of return to the owners of the capital. An entrepreneur will seek to
maximize the present value of his equity in the enterprise. If he is dealing
with competitive capital markets—markets which lend or borrow funds
at interest rates (for given risks) which are constant to the individual
entrepreneur—he will hold any type of investment up to the point where
the last increment yields a rate of return equal to the market interest rate.
Lenders (whether short or long term) will act on the same principle:
they will seek a maximum rate of return (for given risks), and in this
respect they differ from entrepreneurs only in having less taste for risk.2
But many lenders take large risks and many entrepreneurs take fairly small
risks, so it is difficult clearly to distinguish the groups. The owner of
American Telephone and Telegraph common stock functions more as a
lender, in terms of risks and managerial responsibilities, than the owner
of a convertible debenture in a mining company does. This fuzziness is in
1Aconsiderable amount of mobility of resources is necessary even in the absence of
changes in the size of industries required by changing tastes, resources, and technologies.
Members of the labor force change their occupations and often their industries, partly
as an expression of changing personal tastes, partly as a result of increasing age and
knowledge. There is a similar movement of specific capital goods among industries,
although it is presumably smaller because capital goods have shorter lives and are usually
more specialized than workers are. Movement of baseball players over forty to other
occupations, and sale of used cars by car rental agencies are instances of these movements.
Since we have information only on net movements of aggregates of resources, we cannot
trace the movements of individual resources.
2Theyalso differ in having less desire to engage in management of a firm where this
is required by the entrepreneurial role, as in farming. But this difference (like the taste for
risk) is only a matter of degree: the lender must have some knowledge of the borrower's
abilities and character; the entrepreneur must have some knowledge (no doubt, often
more detailed) of the men he hires to manage his enterprise.
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fact one reason for combining entrepreneurial income and interest on
debt into a single return on capital in our statistical work.
Our primary object in this chapter is to examine the traditional theory
of the effect of competition upon the rates of return in different industries
in the light of empirical evidence. Then we examine differences between
concentrated and unconcentrated industries in rates of return.
1. Competition and Equality of Rates of Return
What is the nature of the proposition that under competition there is a
tendency for the rates of return on investments in various industries to
approach equality? It has been taken by some economists as a definition
of competition; persistently high profits in an industry would be proof
that the industry is not competitive. But this usage is one-sided: no one
would argue that the existence of the average rate of return in an industry
proved that the industry is competitive.
More commonly, the proposition is viewed as a corollary of the main
conditions of competition: a considerable number of firms (no one or
few dominant in size) in the industry, and freedom of these firms to leave
or of other firms to enter the industry. When competition is so defined, the
proposition is evidently not a logically necessary corollary, for a lack of
desire for profits or a lack of knowledge of returns in alternative ventures
could render any tendency toward equality of rates so negligible as to be
wholly unimportant. From this point of view, given the conditions of
adequate numbers of firms and freedom of entry, the role of empirical
data isto reveal the degree of knowledge, foresight, and enterprise
possessed by entrepreneurs.
The role of the word "tendency" raises further issues.Economic
analysis tells us that the rates of return in competitive industries will be
strictly equal (in a sense to be noted shortly) in long-run equilibrium, that
is, after a period long enough to allow (enough) entrepreneurs to move to
the industry they favor and operate at the rate of output they desire. But
this very concept of long-run equilibrium reminds us that, in a world
where all events are not perfectly anticipated, there will be a stream of
unexpected disturbances that call for a stream of changes in the allocation
of resources: unanticipated shifts in consumers' desires; the impact upon
international markets of wars and political events; the irregular march of
major advances in technology, and others.
Onc could argue that these unexpected events are so frequent and so
drastic in their effects that long before full adjustments have been made to
one impact—before long-run equilibrium could be regained—a second
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large impact would superimpose reactions on the allocation of capital,
and so on. At a given moment, we might observe in an industry:
1. Beginnings of an extensive investment program designed to provide
a component to another industry which has just received vast orders
from the Department of Defense
2. Continuation of an earlier investment program initiated in response
to the discovery five years ago of large new deposits of resources
3. Retirement of capital goods rendered increasingly obsolete (but not
yet physically worn out) by the introduction of much superior
machines eight years ago
Neither of the earlier impacts will have been fully adjusted to when the
recent expansion called for by military demands begins and, long before
the new impulse is adjusted to, several new and large displacements of
long-run equilibrium may have occurred.
If this were the case—if such unexpected and large disturbances occurred
frequently within the period necessary to bring about a reasonably full
adjustment to just one disturbance—the equality of rates of return would
never be approached even distantly. Almost any amount of dispersion
of rates of return in competitive industries would be consistent with the
basic theoretical proposition, and it would lose most of its value. More
precisely, if the effects of unexpected events on rates of return were very
much larger and more persistent than the effects of competition were, the
proposition on equality of rates would have almost no value in predicting
the direction of investment.
I do not believe this is true: the large unexpected events are not so
frequent relative to the speed with which competition equalizes rates as
this argument implies (and the smaller events will largely cancel each
other).This is an empirical question, however, and one to which we
shall soon turn.
Finally, the strict reading of the proposition on equality of rates of
return is that the returns entrepreneurs equalize are the total of all
advantages and disadvantages—nonmonetary as well as monetary—of
using resources in various fields. An example of such possible nonmone-
tary returns is the pleasures of rural life associated with farming; if they
are widely and strongly appreciated, the equilibrium rate of return in
agriculture would be lower than in other industries. Another example,
more appropriate to our manufacturing universe, is the possible premiums
demanded for investing in very risky industries.Risk premiums are
indeed regarded in the literature of capital allocation as the chief supple-
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ment to average returns, although tax considerations are becoming an
important rival. The fact that investment decisions depend upon more
than the expected number of dollars of return is therefore still another
source of dispersion in the realized rates of return. We should like to
know the quantitative magnitude of this source of dispersion and to
identify its source.
Let us now draw together these threads of discussion. We expect the
rates of return in a set of competitive industries (defined independently
of returns) to approach equality, but subject to several qualifications:
1. Some dispersion would exist because of imperfect knowledge of
returns on alternative investments.
2. Dispersion of returns would arise because of unexpected develop-
ments and events which call for movements of resources requiring
considerable time to be completed.
3. Dispersion would arise because of differences among industries in
monetary and nonmonetary supplements to the average rate of
return.
4. In any empirical study, there is also a fourth source of dispersion:
the difference between the income concepts used in compiling the
data and the income concepts relevant to the allocation of resources.
Before we turn to these various sources of dispersion, it is well to
present the basic data on the rates of return. The distribution of the
average rates for the periods 1938—47 and 1947—56 are presented in
Table l5. In each case the list of industries is restricted to the "uncon-
centrated" ones.This word is not a euphemism for "competitive"
because it takes account (and then, none too well) of only one requisite of
competition: the presence of numerous independent firms (none dominant
in size) in the industry.4 The condition of free entry, which is also a
requisite of competition, is not taken into account because relevant data
are not at hand, but there is some presumption that industries containing
many firms are relatively free of contrived barriers to entry. (The rates
of return in other than unconcentrated industries are considered later.)
The concentration of rates of return within narrow limits is quite marked
The distribution for 1947—54 is also reported because it is used subsequently.
The precise criteria of the class of unconcentrated industries turn on the "con-
centration ratio," that is, the fraction of the "shipments" of each industry produced by
the four largest firms. This ratio is averaged for 1935 and 1947 for the earlier period,
and for 1947 and 1954 for the later period. Unconcentrated industries meet one of two
conditions:(1) the market is national, and the concentration ratio is less than 50 per
cent;(2) the market is regional, and the concentration ratio is less than 20 per cent.
The limitations of the measure are discussed in Appendix C.
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TABLE 15
DISTRIBUTION OF UNCONCENTRATED MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES,
BY AVERAGE RATE OF RETURN, THREE PERIODS, 1938—56


































































SOURCE:Tables A-14 to A-59.
in the first period, and somewhat less so in the second period. The more
protracted impact of extremely heavy corporate excess-profits taxation in
the earlier period is doubtless a major cause of the smaller dispersion. Our
task is to relate the traditional theorem on equalization of rates of return
to these distributions.
STATISTICAL SOURCES OF DISPERSION IN RATES OF RETURN
The basic data of our study have a variety of defects which are discussed
in detail in Chapter 1 and Appendix A. Perhaps the three most important
defects for present purposes are those discussed below.
1. The concept of income appropriate to the economic theory of resource allocation
djffers substantially from the concept underlying the corporate income tax.
The most pervasive difference is that, in economic theory, a produc-
tive service is valued at its maximum product in any alternative use,
whereas corporate income tax rules usually require that costs be actually
(historically) incurred.Putting aside the effects of inflation (discussed
below), we may say that, in a highly stable period, the historical costs of a
firm should approximate the alternative products (or costs) in competitive
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industries:the firm will not acquire or retain resources that are more
valuable in other uses. But the condition for equality of historical and
alternative costs is very severe: the period of stability must be as long as
the life of the most durable assets in the industry. The short-lived assets
(such as inventories) will differ in historical cost from market values unless
the period of stability is also one of rigidity, and the average difference
between the two values will approach zero only over many accounting
periods. In addition, there are a host of technical provisions of the tax
regulations (and of general accounting practices) that have very uneven
impact on different industries.5 It would require an independent investi-
gation of immense scope to ascertain the magnitude of this source of
dispersion of rates of return, and we must be content simply to note its
existence.
2.Officers of small corporations who own much of the stock have considerable
discretion in withdrawing income either as salaries or as returns on capital,
but only the latter form of income enters our rates of return.
There exists no satisfactory direct method of estimating "excess" salary
withdrawals,6 but we know that the problem is quantitatively important
only in industries in which corporations with less than $250,000 of assets
are relatively numerous. It is suggestive that the industry with the lowest
rate of return for 1938—47, millinery (4.67 per cent), had 91.7 per cent of
its corporate assets in the smallest asset classes. We have correlated
average rates of return R with the percentage of industry receipts in







The reduction in dispersion is appreciable: the rates of return before and
See D. T. Smith and J. K. Butters, Taxable and Business Income, New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1949.
6SeeAppendix A.
P has been calculated for one year only in each period: 1943 in the 1938—47 period,
and 1950 in 1947—54. The correlations are based upon all industries, rather than only
unconcentrated industries, because this relationship should be present in all. However,
here, as elsewhere in this chapter with the exception of Tables 15 and 16, those industries
with severe large-company classification problems have been eliminated from the
computations. These exclusions are described on p. 111.
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TABLE 16
DISTRIBUTION OF UNCONCENTRATED INDUSTRIES, BY RATE OF RETURN,
BEFORE AND AFTER ADJUSTMENT FOR SMALL BUSINESS SALARY WITHDRAWALS,
Two PERIODS, 1938—54










































































NOTE: See the accompanying text for explanation of the method of computation.
after adjustment for the varying share of "small" businesses are given in
Table 16.
A simple interpretation of the regression equation may be offered. Let
P and R be defined as above, and let the subscripts u and I denote the
asset classes above and below $250,000.
Then:
R =(1—P)RU+ PR1.
If W is the withdrawal of salaries by officers in the lower size class, b the
fraction of withdrawals that are "excessive" (i.e., really property income),
and I and A1 the respective property income and assets of this class, the





orR=R1—bR1PCOMPETITION AND THE RATE OF RETURN
If we equate the coefficient of P in the last term to .0792 and apply the
equation to the men's clothing industry (see Appendix A), b is .47. Of
course when this equation is estimated from a group of industries, it is
implicitly assumed that the true rate of return is not correlated with P,
i.e., it is assumed that the equilibrium rate of return is not lower in indus-
tries with a larger proportion of small businesses. We examine this
question later.
Omission of noncorporate businesses from the calculations of the rates
of return is a closely related source of dispersion.It is quite possibly an
important source of dispersion because of the wide variations among
industries in the relative importance within them of noncorporate busi-
nesses. If the noncorporate sector of an industry is declining, we can infer
that its rate of return (including nonmonetary elements) is smaller than
the return in the corporate sector and, conversely, that the rate is higher
if the noncorporate sector is growing relatively. But an analysis of variance
revealed no significant association of the share or trend of the noncorporate
sector with the average rate of return of the corporate sector.
The noncorporate profit rate may also influence the average industry
rate by fluctuating more or less over time.If we may judge the fluctua-
tions of the noncorporate rate by that of small corporations, it is in fact
somewhat more stable over time, so the average industry rate over time
would also be more stable if we could measure noncorporate profits.8
3. The asset values on which rates of return are calculated have not been
adjusted for price changes.
An industry that has relatively old assets will have a relatively smaller
asset-value base in a period of inflation, and hence a relatively larger rate
of return.9 The period of our study was continuously inflationary in the
sense that the book values of assets rose in every year relative to their
values in 1947 prices. The difference between rates of return in constant
prices and in book values was not large for the two-digit industries, however
(see Chapter 2, section 3).
The only possible direct measure of the effect of price deflation of assets
and returns on the dispersion of the rates of return is a comparison of the
8 The standard deviations of the annual rates of return for 1947—57 are, in per cent:
Corporations with Assets
Under $100,000 Over $100,000
All manufacturing 1.46 1.84
Food and kindred products 1.38 1.36
Apparel and related products 2.06 2.75
Such a firm will also be charging depreciation on assets valued at lower prices,
which works in the same direction.
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Average rate of return
1947 prices 6.81 7.73
Book values 7.07 7.54
Standard deviation of rates
1947 prices 1.23 1.54
Book values 1.17 1.66
The deflated rates of return thus show a larger dispersion in one period
and a smaller dispersion in the other, but in neither period is the difference
statistically significant.There is some presumption that the effect of
deflation would be greater for the three-digit industries, but we have been
unable to estimate
RISK PREMIUMS
There exists a strong tradition in economics that a positive risk premium
must be paid to investors in risky industries. More precisely, the realized
rate of return, after full allowance for defaults and failures, is expected to
be higher, the riskier the investment. Only a few economists have taken
the opposite position that small prospects of large gains are so highly
esteemed that the net risk premium is negative."
The traditional view is supported by the findings on corporate bonds.
Whether the risk of an issue is based upon ratings by investment agencies,
the market (i.e., by promised yields at market prices), or criteria such as
the number of times fixed charges are earned, the corporate bonds issued
in the United States between 1900 and 1943 confirm this expectation.'2
Hickman leaves open the question whether this premium reflects risk
aversion or institutionallimitations upon investments by financial
intermediaries.
The investors in corporate equities do not necessarily have the same
attitude toward risk, and certainly not the same legal limitations on
purchase of equities. Unfortunately our data do not allow us to contribute
10Onemight expect the difference between deflated and undeflated rates of return
to be correlated with the percentage of fixed capital, but among two-digit industries no
such correlation was found.
11SeeC. 0. Hardy, Risk and Risk Bearing, University of Chicago Press, 1931, p. 38.
12SeeW. B. Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience, Princeton University
Press for National Bureau of Economic Research, 1958, pp. 10 if.
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much to this question. Two alternate measures of risk have failed to yield
any reliable relationships.
The first measure is the standard deviation of the annual rates of return
realized by all reporting corporations in each industry.13 The relations







The results are not heartening: the risk premium coefficient is negative
in the first period and statistically nonsignificant in both periods.
The fluctuations over time in an industry's rate of return are risks to
investors as a group. The dispersion of rates of return among firms
measures the risks to investors in one firm, and is at least equally relevant
to entrepreneurial decisions. An estimate of firm dispersions can be
constructed from Statistics of Income, which reports the share of returns
with no net income, and the average rates of return of both income and
deficit corporations. On the assumption that the distribution of rates of
return is normal, one may estimate the standard deviation for an industry,
by asset classes, in each year.'4 An average was calculated for the two
prosperous years, 1948 and 1953, and the two recession years, 1949 and
1954. The average of these four standard deviations proves to have a
nonsignificant (positive) relationship to average rates of return.
"Thisaverage includes corporations taking losses, so long as income tax returns are
filed.
14Themethod may be illustrated by the data for the $50,000 to $100,000 asset class
for all manufacturing industries, 1949:
Average Rate of Return
Per Cent of Returns Before 'Taxes
(per cent)
Income corporations 60.8 11.86
Deficit corporations 39.2 —15.44
From a table of mean deviates (H. M. Leverett, "Table of Mean Deviates for
Various Portions of the Unit Normal Distribution," Psychometrika, June 1947), one finds
that with a normal distribution the top 60.8 per cent of cases has a mean of .629 a, and




or a =16.92per cent, as a weighted average of the two estimates. The estimate for each
asset class is in turn weighted, to strike an industry average, by the share of industry assets.
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These two measures of risk are so crude that we are not entitled to
conclude that no risk premiums are demanded. All that can be concluded
is that we find no evidence of such premiums in our own restricted
investigation."
2. Sources and Correction of Disequilibriurns
If the entrepreneurs in a competitive industry correctly anticipated all
relevant future events and if they were able fully to adjust theirs plans, no
disequilibriums could arise: the markets would be in full equilibrium at
every moment of time. All disequilibriums arise out of imperfect or tardy
anticipation of future events, and they persist only until the adjustment
of rates of investment and output they call for can be made.
The sources of disequilibrium are infinitely varied—discovery of new
mineral deposits or new techniques, closing or opening of foreign markets,
new regulations by governmental bodies, increase of competition within
an industry, and so forth. All leave their impact upon the rates of return,
and we can, in fact, turn our analysis around and define the fluctuations
in an industry's profit rate as the measure of the extent and duration of
disequilibriums.'°
The Marshallian theory, which is the parent of modern theories of the
role of time in attaining equilibrium, emphasizes certain barriers to the
immediate adaptation of a firm to new conditions. These barriers are
usually subsumed under the headings of technological and contractual
limitations.'7Technological limitations arise out of the durability of
certain capital forms, which delay the withdrawal of specialized resources,
and the time required for construction of new capital, which delays
expansion of productive capacity.Contractual obligations set limits
upon the short-run discretion of the firm, for they fix prices or rates of
purchase or sale. The speed of adaptation to new conditions will therefore
16Ifany further documentation of the elusiveness of the risk factor is needed, we may
cite a related inquiry:is the average rate of return different in industries with relatively
much borrowed capital from that in industries with relatively little borrowed capital?
The "leverage" of high borrowings would argue that risks of equity holders were larger
in the former type of industry. Again no statistically significant relationship was found.
Of course the industries with more stable rates of return can safely borrow relatively
more, which makes the interpretation of this finding difficult.
16Fluctuationsin an industry's profit rate can be measured either in absolute terms or
relative to the average rate in all industries. The former measure presumably records
the total forces of disequilibrium, whereas the measure based upon annual deviations
of the industry's rate from that of all industries will eliminate general business fluctuations
to the extent that they affect all industries similarly.
17Theword technological is not ideal, for the importance of technological factors
depends upon the price a company is willing to pay: the construction period of a plant
can be halved if it is willing to pay the extra costs of the speed.
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be governed by the relative use of specialized and durable assets and the
time required to produce them, and by the extent and nature of contractual
obligations.
Most contractual obligations run for a year or less, and it is improbable
that they are an important barrier to adaptations to market changes in
so short a time. The growing practice of leasing plants (often financed by
pension funds) is giving a larger role to long-run commitments, but this
development is too recent to leave a large imprint upon rates of return in
the period we study.
Consider, then, specialized and durable resources.Obviously, if
resources are not specialized, they can be shifted among industries, and
usually on a large scale within a year or two. If they are not durable, an
industry can contract its productive capacity rapidly by failing to replace
worn-out assets if demand falls.If resources are quickly producible, the
industry can expand its capacity rapidly when demand rises or costs fall.
We cannot identify specialized resources in our industries, but we can
measure the variations among industries in the use of fixed (durable)
capital. We would expect rates of return in relatively unprofitable
industries to rise (toward the general level) more rapidly, the less the share
of fixed assets in total capital.
This hypothesis has been tested by the following procedure. The trough
(or peak) in the profit rate of an industry (relative to the average of all
industries) in a given period is first identified. Then the magnitude of the
differences in the profit rate in that and succeeding years is calculated,
and the amount by which the profit rate approaches the average is
correlated with the percentage of fixed to all assets.'8
The results have not been in keeping with expectations. The amount by
which an industry's rate of return moves toward the average of all indus-
tries proves to be positively correlated with the ratio of fixed to total
capital, whereas Marshall's theory predicts a negative correlation. The
correlation coefficients are not statistically significant, however.The
introduction of an additional variable, change in sales, does not improve
the situation.'9
18 This percentage is calculated for a year in the middle of the period, since it normally
does not change much from year to year.
10 For the period, 1947—54, the results may be summarizedlet x1 be the increase in
the rate of return a year after the trough (or decrease after the peak); x5 the ratio of
fixed to total capital in 1950; and x3 the percentage increase in sales receipts. Then
From troughs (n =27)
=.330 r153 =.329
.033 - = .013
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Imperfect as our measures are, they suggest at least tentatively that
Marshall's emphasis upon fixed capital as the prime determinant of the
rate of return to equilibrium may be misplaced. The effect of specialized
and durable resources is surely in the direction his theory describes, but
it may be that the adjustments are completed largely within a year, or the
effects of fixed plants are important only for very large displacements from
equilibrium, or some other factor we have not isolated conceals the effects.
We have observed that the sources of disequilibrium are enormously
diverse, but many of them operate upon the selling price of the industries
on which they impinge. A shift in demand, a change in taxes, a change in
foreign markets or international competition, higher prices of comple-
mentary or substitute products—all such forces will leave their mark on
the price history of the industry in question.
Steady changes in prices should not occasion or mirror disequilibrium,
however, for they can be fully anticipated. If prices rise 5 per cent a year,
for whatever reason, the entrepreneurs will adjust their investment plans
so the price rise will be no occasion for unusual profits. For the fifty-eight
industries for which price indexes could be constructed, we have therefore
taken as our mesure of unanticipated price movements the standard
deviation of the prices after elimination of a linear trend.2° The unantici-
pated price fluctuations, so measured, are in fact correlated (r =.336)
with the standard deviations of the industry profit rates over the period
1947—54. It is interesting to note that the magnitude of price fluctuations,
when not corrected for trend, is wholly uncorrelated with fluctuations of
profit rates (r =—.001).
3. Returns in Concentrated and Unconcentrated Industries
Economic theorists have long emphasized the differences in rates of
return—and other aspects of business enterprise such as price behavior—
between competitive and monopolistic industries. Some of these hypo-




r,5= — .680 r,5,= — .675
Scatter diagrams of similar analyses for 1938—47 suggest similar findings, except that
there is a weak negative correlation between x1 and x, for decreases from peaks.
When the return to the mean is expressed as a percentage of the initial peak or trough,
the relationships are generally even weaker.
'°Thatis, if c is the standard deviation of the price index over a given period, and r
isthe correlation of the index with time, c( 1 —r')'I' isthe measure of unanticipated price
fluctuations.
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The definition of unconcentrated industries has already been given.2'
Concentrated industries are simply those in which the four leading firms
produce 60 per cent or more of the value added, and for which the market
is national.Industries falling in neither of these categories are labeled
ambiguous. It should be noticed that some of the unclassified (ambiguous)
industries, operating in smaller than national markets, may be effectively
more concentrated than those we so designate. Readers who are acquainted
with either the highly controversial literature on concentration ratios or
the even more controversial literature on antitrust policy hardly need be
told that a concentrated industry need not be monopolistic. High elasti-
city of demand for the industry's product, or ease of entry by new firms,
or the extent of independent rivalry among firms may make the con-
centrated industry (in this definition) differ in, at most, trifling respects
from a fully competitive industry. This difficulty of classification must be
faced frankly, but it is not possible to attempt here a more refined classi-
fication. One can only give plain warning that discrepancies between the
hypotheses of the traditional theory and the findings below may be due
in some part to the deficiencies of industry classification.
THE LEVEL OF RATES OF RETURN
The average rate of return of monopolistic industriesshould, by
hypothesis, be greater than that of competitive industries. A monopolist
can always enter competitive industries, so he will not be content with less
than a competitive rate of return on investment in the long run. On the
other hand, there will normally be important barriers to entry of new
competitors in a monopolistic industry, or it would not remain mono-
polistic.Isthisexpectation confirmedinour concentrated and
unconcentrated industries?
The answer is somewhat ambiguous, but on the whole it is negative
(see Table 17). The concentrated industries have a higher average rate in
1938—40 and after 1948 (but not in the eight intervening years), according
to the annual data. The differences between concentrated and uncon-
centrated industries in the periods 1951—54 and 1955—57 were statistically
significant at the 5 and 2 per cent levels, respectively. These findings
suggest a weak affirmative answer, but a qualification undermines them.
Over the period 1947—54, the average rate in the concentrated industries
was 8.00 per cent, that in the unconcentrated industries 7.16 per cent. If
one adjusts the returns for excess withdrawals of officers of small corpora-
21Footnote4, this chapter, and Appendix C.
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TABLE 17
AVERAGE RATE OF RETURN AND STANDARD DEVIATION OF RATES OF






AVERAGE RATE OF RETURN
(per cent)
1938—41 6.51 5.25 6.59
1942—44 6.23 7.68 7.19
1945—47 7.30 10.01 8.64
1948—50 9.11 8.02 8.90
1951—54 6.33 5.05 5.90
1955—57 7,05 5.44 6.35
STANDARD DEVIATION OF RATE OF
(per cent)
RETURN
1938—41 2.60 2.83 2.70
1942—44 1.48 1.40 2.01
1945—47 2.80 2.20 2.15
1948—50 2.82 2.52 2.46
1951—54 1.33 2.21 1.79
1955—57 2.10 2.29 1.75
SOURCE: Tables A-14 to A-59, and C-I and C-2.
lions, which are important in the unconcentrated industries, the differ-
ences almost vanish.22
This same conclusion is reached by correlation analysis. Of our indus-
tries, twenty-five have national markets: in this group the coefficient of
correlation of concentration ratios and average rate of return (corrected
for withdrawals) was .130 in 1947—54.In fourteen industries with
'Inthe concentrated industrieS, the corporations with assets under $250,000 had
on average 1.6 per cent of all receipts, whereas the corresponding percentage in un-
concentrated industries was 12.7. On the basis of the regression equation (p. 59, above),
this factor would account for 95 per cent, or almost all, of the observed difference.
Using data for registered companies, J. S. Bain found that, in the period 1936—40,
when the concentration ratio (for the eight largest firms) exceeded 70 per cent, the
average rate of return of the industry was substantially higher ("Relation of Profit Rate
to Industry Concentration," Quarterly Journal of Econo,nics, Aug. 1951). For the sixteen
of his forty-two industries that can be approximately identified with our industries, the
same result holds for 1938—40—the correlation coefficient between profit rates and
concentration is .53. For the period 1947—54, however, neither the difference in means of
the two classes (concentration ratios above and below 50 per cent for four firms, roughly
corresponding to his 70 per cent level for eight firms) nor the correlation coefficient of
profit rates and concentration differs significantly from zero.
68COMPETITIOX AXD THE RATE OF RETURX
regional markets the coefficient was —.085,and in nine industries with
local markets, —.379.In no case was the correlation coefficient significant
at the 10 per cent level.
It is possible, of course, that a higher level of profits will be reflected in
the value of the assets of the industries receiving the profits, whereas the
traditional theory predicts higher rates for monopolies on assets valued,
not on the basis of earnings, but of alternative products of the assets.
Before the economic theorist embraces this popular—and untestable—
interpretation of these findings, he should consider the analysis in the
next section.
THE DISPERSION OF RATES OF RETURN
Some monopolistic industries will have very high rates of return, if they
can preserve their position, because of favorable demand and cost condi-
tions, whereas others will earn only as much as competitive industries,
because of unfavorable demand and cost conditions. These differences
can persist in monopolistic industries, whose high profits will not be
quickly eroded by new rivals, whereas the profits of competitive industries
will be. Hence the traditional theory implies that the dispersion of average
rates of return (over a substantial period) among competitive industries
will be smaller than that of monopolistic industries.
At first glance, the data seem equally unkind to this hypothesis (Table
17). The standard deviation of average rates of return of the concentrated
industries is higher in periods from 1942 to 1950, but the differences are
not large, and the opposite relationship holds in the terminal periods.
But here the adjustment for excess salary withdrawals of officers in small
corporations plays an opposite role to that in the average rates of return.
The share of assets held by small corporations varies widely among
unconcentrated industries, but is always small in concentrated industries.
If we adjust the average rates for this factor, the following variances are
obtained:
1938—47
variance of concentrated industries—5.809
—384 variance of unconcentrated industries —1.513—
with10 and 36 degrees of freedom.
1947—54
varianceof concentrated industries—4.841
—155 variance of unconcentrated industries —3.120—
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with 13 and 53 degrees of freedom. The former variance ratio is significant
at the 1 per cent level, the latter only at the 20 per cent level.23
The larger dispersion of rates of return of concentrated industries
demands reconciliation with the failure to find a higher rate of return, for
both hypotheses rest upon the same theoretical argument. The recon-
ciliation may simply be that the concentrated industries, which are few in
number, include enough essentially competitive industries to mask the
higher rates of return of the truly monopolistic industries.Alternately,
it may be that concentration itself, quite aside from any monopoly power,
is associated with characteristics (e.g., large cyclical fluctuations of output)
which make for dispersion of profits.
STABILITY OF THE PATTERN OF RATES OF RETURN
The final hypothesis to be considered here is the stability of the industrial
pattern of rates of return. The argument is intimately related to that of
the previous hypotheses.Competitive industries will have a volatile
pattern of rates of return, for the movements into high-profit industries
and out of low-profit industries will—together with the flow of new
disturbances of equilibrium—lead to a constantly changing hierarchy of
rates of return.In the monopolistic industries, on the other hand, the
unusually profitable industries will be able to preserve their preferential
position for considerable periods of time.
The correlation coefficients between the rates of return at various time
intervals are averaged in Table 18. On the whole, the pattern of coeffi-
cients agrees remarkably well with the hypothesis.The industrial
pattern of rates is extremely stable in the concentrated industries: even
after eight years it was still .5 in both periods. The industrial pattern is
much more volatile in the unconcentrated industries, although here the
record is somewhat different in the two periods.In the war period the
correlation coefficients approached zero when the time span reached four
years, whereas in the postwar period the correlation coefficient did not
fall below .4 until six years had elapsed.It may be that the mobilization
and demobilization affected the unconcentrated industries much more
unevenly than they affected the concentrated industries, most of which
became important producers of munitions.
"Theambiguous industries also have larger variances than the unconcentrated
industries.
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TABLE 18
CORRELATION OF RATES OF RETURN FOR CONCENTRATED, UNCONCENTRATED,






RATES OF RETURN IN YEAR T AND (T + 1)
Concentrated 9 .76 8 .74
Unconcentrated 9 .69 8 .72
Ambiguous 9 .82 8 .77
RATES IN YEAR T AND (T + 2)
Concentrated 8 .56 7 .72
Unconcentrated 8 .41 7 .61
Ambiguous 8 .58 7 .70
RATES IN YEAR T AND (T + 3)
Concentrated 7 .58 6 .66
Unconcentrated 7 .18 6 .57
Ambiguous 7 .40 6 .64
RATES IN YEAR T AND (T ± 4)
Concentrated 6 .56 5 .69
Unconcentrated 6 .10 5 .53
Ambiguous 6 .30 5 .64
RATES IN YEAR T AND (T + 5)
Concentrated 5 .54 4 .71
Unconcentrated 5 .06 4 .47
Ambiguous 5 .20 4 .70
RATES IN YEAR T AND (T + 6)
Concentrated 4 .49 5 .57
Unconcentrated 4 .24 5 .36
Ambiguous 4 .15 5 .57
RATES IN YEAR T AND (T + 7)
Concentrated 3 .60 4 .57
Unconcentrated 3 .04 4 .26
Ambiguous 3 .16 4 .38
RATES IN YEAR T AND (T + 8)
Concentrated 2 .49 3 .53
Unconcentrated 2 .00 3 .27
Ambiguous 2 .04 3 .38
RATES IN YEAR T AND (T + 9)
Concentrated 1 .38 2 .35
Unconcentraled 1 .17 2 .20
Ambiguous 1 —.15 2 .37




SOURCE: Same as for Table 17.
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